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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, Robyn McEuen began working for a branch of AutoZone in 
Cordova, Tennessee.1 She excelled in her position and was promoted to the 
position of commercial specialist the following year.2 In 2012, McEuen was 
required to report to a new store manager, Gustavus Townsel, who was 
transferred to McEuen’s store from a different branch.3 Immediately 
thereafter, McEuen became the subject of disparaging, predatory, and 
inappropriate remarks and actions made by Townsel—Townsel would grab 
McEuen from behind, touch her genital region, and repeatedly proposition 
McEuen despite her continual efforts to rebuff his advances.4 Townsel 
subjected McEuen to this harassment for months while her co-workers turned 
a blind eye to the conduct, reasoning that she must not have been that upset 
because she would have reported it if she were.5 
Robyn McEuen’s story is one of thousands of women who experience 
sexual harassment in the workplace each year in the United States. In 2019, 
there were 7,514 allegations of sexual harassment filed with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).6 This number does not 
 
1 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Autozone, Inc., 692 F. App’x 280, 281 (6th Cir. 2017). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 281-82. 
5 Id. at 282. 
6 Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010-FY 2018, 
EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement
/sexual_harassment_new.cfm [https://perma.cc/8LW5-3CUX]. 
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nearly represent the extent of the issue, as many instances of workplace 
harassment go unreported. Studies have found that approximately less than 
thirteen percent of victims of harassment file a formal complaint—a statistic 
which may even be inflated.7 
Since 2017, the rise of the #MeToo movement has brought greater 
attention to issues of sexual harassment in the workplace.8 This movement 
was founded by civil rights activist Tarana Burke, who created a nonprofit to 
raise awareness and provide resources for women who have been victims of 
sexual harassment and violence.9 The movement became a phenomenon 
through social media in late 2017 after Alyssa Milano, a Hollywood actress, 
posted on Twitter asking those who had “been sexually harassed or assaulted 
[to] write ‘me too’” in response to her tweet.10 Hundreds of thousands posted 
on the social media platform in response using the “MeToo” phrasing, 
sparking a significant social movement.11 This has brought great attention to 
issues related to workplace harassment, resulting in walkouts,12 strikes,13 and 
 
7 CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
Selective Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace 16 (2016), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm#_ftnref63 [https://perma.cc/XC9V-
28NX]. As many women may never disclose that they are victims of workplace harassment, this 
statistic is likely lower in actuality. 
8 The #MeToo movement is not limited to giving a voice to those who have experienced 
harassment in the workplace, but victims of harassment generally. See, e.g., ME TOO, 
https://metoomvmt.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/KT6A-2NU5] 
(providing general information about the “me too” movement). 
9 Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before the Hashtags, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html 
[https://perma.cc/6XQ8-PJXE]. In creating her nonprofit, Just Be Inc., Burke “sought out the 
resources that she had not found readily available .	.	. and committed herself to being there for 
people who had been abused.” Id. 
10 Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/MN93-YCBY]. 
Milano’s tweet was prompted in the wake of allegations of sexual assault and harassment against 
Harvey Weinstein, a Hollywood producer. Garcia, supra note 9. 
11 Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68	EMORY L.J. ONLINE	1014, 
1014 (2018), https://law.emory.edu/elj/elj-online/volume-68/essays/title-vii-me-too-movement.html 
[https://perma.cc/G6NK-HC5R]. 
12 See, e.g., Jane Lanhee Lee & Paresh Dave, Google’s ‘#Metoo’ Moment: Workers Walk Out Over 
Women’s Rights, REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-alphabet-google-
harassment/google-workers-walk-out-to-protest-office-harassment-inequality-idUSKCN1N644R 
[https://perma.cc/CH27-JEYQ] (explaining how Google employees around the world walked out to 
protest workplace harassment). Though the #MeToo movement is not limited to addressing issues of 
harassment in the workplace, this Comment will focus on the movement as related to workplace 
harassment and the changes that should follow. 
13 See, e.g., Sarah Whitten, McDonald’s Employees Stage First #MeToo Strike, CNBC (Sept. 18, 
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/18/mcdonalds-employees-to-stage-first-metoo-strike.html 
[https://perma.cc/4J25-X4Q7] (detailing how McDonald’s workers staged the “first multistate 
walkout protesting sexual harassment” and carried signs that read “#MeToo McDonald’s”). 
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attempts to influence state and congressional legislation.14 The support of this 
movement may explain an increase in workplace harassment charges filed 
with the EEOC between 2017 and 2018.15 However, social movements can 
only go so far to rectify the situation if the law surrounding the issue does 
not afford victims a remedy, or if the law prevents them from obtaining one. 
The current state of the law does not favor victims of supervisory 
harassment who bring workplace harassment claims against their employers. 
If a plaintiff-employee brings such a claim, the plaintiff ’s employer can raise 
a defense known as the Faragher-Ellerth defense. When applying the defense, 
the court examines whether the employer was reasonable in seeking to 
prevent and correct any instances of harassment, and whether the employee 
was reasonable in taking advantage of the preventative or corrective measures 
offered.16 Problematically, federal courts have inconsistently applied both 
elements of the defense, which has raised serious impediments to plaintiffs’ 
workplace harassment claims. With respect to the first element of the defense, 
the Fourth Circuit, for example, has placed the burden on the plaintiff to 
rebut evidence that the defendant-employer was successful in preventing the 
harassment, and other jurisdictions have disregarded the necessity to find the 
defendant-employer acted to provide corrective measures to instances of 
harassment.17 The inconsistent applications of the defense is a significant 
impediment to plaintiffs because they infringe upon both the predictability 
of their claims and the goal of deterring workplace harassment. 
With regard to the second element of the defense, some circuit courts 
have held that there is no need to consider this element in cases where an 
employee reports a single, severe instance of harassment, which further 
 
14 See, e.g., Cara Kelly & Aaron Hegarty, #MeToo Was a Culture Shock. But Changing Laws Will 
Take More Than a Year, USA TODAY (October 4, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news 
/investigations/2018/10/04/metoo-me-too-sexual-assault-survivors-rights-bill/1074976002/ 
[https://perma.cc/QV3A-9BN9]. A study conducted by USA Today found “since #MeToo began, 
elected officials passed 261 [state] laws that directly addressed topics championed by the movement, 
just a slight uptick from the 238 in the year prior.” Id. However, few of those laws “substantially 
remove the barriers for victims to report and seek justice,” and no new congressional laws have 
passed. Id. Congress is currently considering the EMPOWER Act, which was introduced during 
the 2018 Congressional session. Id. The Act will seek to restrict non-disclosure agreements related 
to sexual harassment in the workplace and create a “tip line” run by the Equal Opportunity 
Employment Commission. Id. Currently, the bill has been referred to the Subcommittee on the 
Constitutional, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties. H.R. 1521-EMPOWER Act, CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1521/all-actions?r=97&overview
=closed#tabs [https://perma.cc/R7FA-JM9L]. 
15 In 2017, 6,697 charges were filed with the EEOC, while in 2018, 7,609 were filed. Charges 
Alleging Sex-Based Harassment, supra note 6. 
16 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (defining the two necessary 
elements of an affirmative defense an employer can raise when “subject to vicarious liability to a 
victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor”). 
17 See infra Section II.A. 
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contributes to the inconsistency in which it has applied.18 Additionally, 
courts will frequently find that it is unreasonable as a matter of law if a 
woman waits or fails to report allegations of supervisory harassment to her 
employer and will grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant-
employer.19 Courts will find plaintiffs’ delays in reporting to be unreasonable 
even if the plaintiff appears to have a justifiable reason for delaying to report 
her allegations of harassment.20 This is problematic as courts fail to consider 
the psychological impact harassment can have on a woman. Studies have 
reported on the psychological trauma and physical manifestations of this 
trauma victims of harassment may suffer, which can influence a woman’s 
choice to delay or refrain from reporting.21 In the case of Robyn McEuen, 
because McEuen’s claims went unreported for approximately two and a half 
months, a case brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
against McEuen’s employer failed.22 
Federal courts’ application of this defense impedes victims from 
vindicating their rights and fails to give credence to their claims. For these 
reasons, courts should adopt a modified approach that allows for both a more 
consistent application of the Faragher-Ellerth defense and permits courts to 
consider victims’ responses to instances of harassment. With respect to the 
first element of the defense, this approach should encourage consideration of 
whether the defendant-employer implemented an equitable anti-harassment 
policy and whether the employer responded reasonably in providing 
corrective measures for alleged instances of harassment. With respect to the 
second element of the defense, this approach should encourage consideration 
of the employee’s rationale for waiting to report an instance of harassment. 
Courts should refrain from determining the reasonableness of both elements 
of the defense as a matter of law, as material facts often exist with respect to 
each element. 
One such approach has been adopted by the Third Circuit in a decision 
published in July of 2018, Minarsky v. Susquehanna County.23 This decision 
held that reasonableness is “the cornerstone of this analysis” and that it is 
best left for the jury to decide.24 This decision has recently received some 
attention, with scholarship noting that Minarsky “is more consistent with the 
language of Faragher and Ellerth opinions, as well as the policy underlying 
 
18 See infra Section II.B. 
19 See infra subsection II.C.1. 
20 See infra subsection II.C.2–3. 
21 See infra subsection II.C.4. 
22 Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. AutoZone Inc., 692 F. App’x 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2017). 
23 895 F.3d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 2018). 
24 Id. at 311. 
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Title VII.”25 Significantly, no other federal circuit court has adopted a similar 
standard of reasonableness to apply to this defense. 
This Comment will focus on why a new approach is needed to the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense. I will detail how federal courts have applied 
incongruous and disjointed reasoning when addressing hostile work 
environment claims with respect to both elements of the defense, and how 
courts have failed to consider the psychological impact that instances of 
harassment can have on victims that may contribute to their reluctance or 
failure to report claims of harassment to their employer. I will argue that in 
light of the #MeToo movement, this problematic application poses a serious 
impediment to plaintiff-employees seeking to vindicate their rights in 
bringing these claims. Overall, I will contend that it is necessary for courts to 
reconsider this standard and apply an approach, like the approach articulated 
by the Third Circuit, that emphasizes the reasonableness of both parties. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE VII AND SUPERVISORY HARASSMENT 
CLAIMS 
Workplace harassment claims were not always actionable. Section 703 of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it an “unlawful employment 
practice” for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or to 
“tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise 
adversely affect his status as an employee” on the basis of sex.26 However, it 
was not until 1986 that the Supreme Court affirmatively acknowledged that a 
cause of action existed to redress instances of harassment an employee 
experienced in the workplace as a result of their supervisor’s conduct.27 In 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court held that “a plaintiff may 
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex 
has created a hostile or abusive work environment.”28 This groundbreaking 
 
25 Matthew D. Venuti, Modernizing the Workplace: The Third Circuit Puts the Faragher-Ellerth 
Affirmative Defense in Context, 64 VILL. L. REV. 535, 538 (2019). 
26 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2018). It is also unlawful for an employer to take such actions 
against an employee on the basis of the employee’s race, color, religion or national origin. Id. 
27 A claim of hostile work environment by an employee’s co-worker is held to a different 
standard: “[I]f the harassing employee is a co-worker, a negligence standard applies. To satisfy that 
standard, the complainant must show that the employer knew or should have known of the offensive 
conduct but failed to take appropriate corrective action.” Vance v. Ball St. Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 453-
54 (2013). This Comment addresses claims of harassment against an employee’s supervisor only. 
28 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). In this case, Mechelle Vinson brought an action against her former 
employer, Meritor Savings Bank, and her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, alleging that during her four 
years working at the bank, she was subjected to sexual harassment by Taylor. Id. at 59-60. Vinson 
alleged that after she was trained as a teller at the bank in 1974, Taylor invited her to dinner and 
“suggested that they go to a motel to have sexual relations.” Id. at 60. Vinson alleged she feared 
 
2020] Redefining Reasonableness 1067 
case marked the first time that the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged 
that victims of harassment in the workplace can have a remedy in court.29 
The Court held that hostile work environment claims can arise in the 
presence of a tangible employment action,30 which includes decisions that 
“[a]ffect a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, 
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, 
or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”31 However, a hostile 
work environment claim can also be actionable in the absence of a tangible 
employment action.32 Further, the Court in Meritor explained that for such a 
claim to be actionable, it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working 
environment.”33 Later, the Court in Harris v. Forklift held that “severe or 
pervasive” is held to both a subjective and objective standard—conduct must 
have “create[d] an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an 
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive” and the 
victim must have subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive as well.34 
 
losing her job and thus agreed to Taylor’s request. Id. Vinson alleged that Taylor subsequently 
repeatedly demanded that Vinson perform sexual acts on him and that out of fear, Vinson agreed. 
Id. Vinson alleged that Taylor touched her inappropriately, exposed himself to her, followed her into 
the restroom, and that Taylor raped her several times. Id. The case went to trial, and Vinson testified 
that due to her fear of Taylor “she never reported his harassment to any of his supervisors and never 
attempted to use the bank’s complaint procedure.” Id. at 61. The district court held that Vinson was 
not the victim of sexual harassment during the course of her employment, reasoning that any sexual 
relationship between Vinson and her supervisor was voluntary because it was unrelated to her 
employment or advancement; thus, there was no quid pro quo. Id. The District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals reversed and held that “a violation of Title VII may be predicated on .	.	. harassment that 
.	.	. creates a hostile or offensive working environment.” Id. at 62. The Supreme Court affirmed this 
interpretation of Title VII and held that “[t]he correct inquiry is whether respondent by her conduct 
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in 
sexual intercourse was voluntary.” Id. at 68. The Court held that harassment may be predicated on 
either “harassment that involves the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, 
and harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or offensive working 
environment.” Id. at 62. Harassment that involves conditioning employment benefits or favors is 
known as quid pro quo and entails “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and 
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” Id. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R §	1604.11(a) (1985)). 
The focus of this Comment will be on claims of hostile work environment that do not affect 
economic benefits, or non-quid pro quo claims. 
29 See Robert R. Graham, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Need to Revisit the 
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 423, 426 (2016) 
(citing Meritor as the first specific recognition of two kinds of actionable harassment claims: quid 
pro quo and hostile environment). 
30 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
31 Vance, 570 U.S. at 431 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). 
32 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
33 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
34 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The Court explained that the “severe or pervasive” standard “takes a 
middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the 
conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.” Id. These effects do not have to be tangible in 
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In Meritor, the Court did not explicitly hold that an employer can be 
vicariously liable for the harassing conduct of a supervisor that gives rise to a 
claim of hostile work environment and declined to opine on “a definitive rule 
on employer liability” regarding the standard of vicarious liability in that 
context.35 However, in 1998, the Supreme Court did hold that an employer 
can be vicariously liable for the actions of a supervisor who has subjected an 
employee to harassing conduct that is severe or pervasive.36 The Court sought 
to square this imposition of vicarious liability by preventing an employer 
from becoming “‘automatically’ liable for harassment by a supervisor who 
creates the requisite degree of discrimination.”37 In differentiating a claim of 
supervisory harassment from the standard surrounding traditional agency 
liability, the Court held that “[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken, 
a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, 
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”38 The Supreme Court 
in 2013 clarified the definition of supervisor by holding that a supervisor is 
one who can “cause ‘direct economic harm’ by taking a tangible employment 
action” against an employee.39 Thus, the defense can only be applied in hostile 
work environment claims where the allegation is that a supervisor did not take 
a tangible action against the plaintiff-employee. 
This affirmative defense requires that a defendant-employer prove two 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence; the first requires “that the 
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any 
sexually harassing behavior” and the second requires “that the plaintiff 
 
nature; the Court noted that “the very fact that discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive 
that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or 
national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.” Id. at 22. The Court made clear 
that a “discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect 
employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job performance, 
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers” and 
that “no single factor is required” in determining whether an environment is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive. Id. at 22-23. 
35 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. 
36 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
37 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998). The Court has also noted that 
although employers can be held vicariously liable for intentional torts that their employees commit 
within the scope of their employment, “[t]he general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor 
is not conduct within the scope of employment.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757. 
38 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The exact language detailing the elements needed to establish a 
hostile work environment claim against one’s supervisor varies slightly between circuit courts. 
Generally, to meet a prima facie case, an employee must show that he or she suffered discrimination 
because her or she is a member of a protected class, that it was severe or pervasive, and that respondeat 
superior liability exists. See, e.g., Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013). 
39 Vance v. Ball St. Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 440 (2013); see also Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 
129, 134 (2004) (clarifying that if an employee is constructively discharged, in that the employee 
feels forced to resign due to an abusive working environment, this does not count as a tangible 
employment action and the defense can be applied). 
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employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm 
otherwise.”40 If a plaintiff alleges that a supervisor committed harassment in 
the absence of a tangible employment action, the employer must demonstrate 
both of these elements to assert the affirmative defense.41 This has come to 
be known as the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense after the name of two 
Supreme Court decisions released on the same day in 1998, Burlington 
Industries v. Ellerth42 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.43 
This defense has frequently been raised,44 as it allows courts to grant 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer when both prongs are 
met. The defense sought to achieve the goals of avoiding harm and 
encouraging victims of harassment to come forward and report their 
allegations of harassment.45 In practice, however, federal courts’ interpretation 
and application of the defense has become an unjustified hurdle for plaintiffs 
and, in many instances, both elements of the defense are easily met even in 
circumstances of egregious harassment.46 If the Faragher-Ellerth defense had 
been applied to the facts of Meritor, it is unlikely that a lower court would have 
found that the defendant-employer was liable and would have granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff never 
reported the harassment to her employer.47 Since the establishment of the 
defense, federal courts have been otherwise unsympathetic to plaintiffs, many 
of whom suffer in silence. Such treatment by federal courts is intolerable and 
a new approach to the defense must be recognized. 
 
40 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
41 Id. 
42 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
43 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
44 A search on Westlaw reveals that in the past three years alone the defense has been cited 
nearly 300 times. 
45 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806; see also L. Camille Hebert, Why Don’t Reasonable Women Complain 
about Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 715 (2007) (“The Court noted that the affirmative defense 
was intended to support Title VII’s ‘policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving 
action by objecting employees.’” (citation omitted)). 
46 See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Serv., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1276-77, 1293 (11th Cir. 
2003) (granting summary judgment for the defendant-employer that invoked the affirmative defense 
in a case in which the plaintiff ’s supervisor repeatedly raped her). 
47 See supra note 28 and related explanation of factual circumstances of Meritor. The plaintiff 
did not report the years of harassment she experienced because she feared her supervisor. Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 61 (1986). 
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II.  FARAGHER-ELLERTH IN PRACTICE: THE PROBLEMATIC 
APPLICATION TO SUPERVISORY HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
Federal courts’ application of the Faragher-Ellerth defense is problematic 
for several reasons. Primarily, federal courts have adopted inconsistent 
standards when applying both the first and second elements of the defense; 
thus, an employee-victim’s case is influenced by the jurisdiction in which the 
case is brought.48 In rendering these decisions, federal courts are quick to 
allow employers to escape liability at the summary judgment stage, despite 
the existence of questions of material facts. Through this defense, federal 
courts have applied the law in such cases “in ways quite hostile to the interests 
of women who have been sexually harassed and quite favorable to the interests 
of employers whose supervisory employees have been accused of sexual 
harassment.”49 They have failed to give due deference to victims’ concerns 
and reasons for waiting to report harassment.50 Such applications of this 
defense have resulted in serious impediments for plaintiff-employees in 
bringing their claims and, in the interest of justice, should be reevaluated. 
A. Inconsistent Applications of the First Prong of the Affirmative Defense 
As noted, federal courts have inconsistently applied the first element of 
the affirmative defense to cases of supervisory harassment, which requires 
“that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior.”51 In both Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme 
Court did not explicitly outline the approach federal courts should take in 
addressing this first prong, but did offer that “the need for a stated policy 
suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in 
any case when litigating the first element of the defense.”52 
Based on the Supreme Court’s language, most federal courts have 
recognized that the first prong includes two subcomponents: the employer 
must take measures to both prevent harassment and to correct instances of 
harassment that the employer becomes aware of.53 However, federal courts 
 
48 See infra Sections II.A–B. 
49 Hebert, supra note 45, at 715. 
50 See infra Section II.C. 
51 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
52 Id.; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778. 
53 See, e.g., Weger v. City of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that “[t]he first 
element of the affirmative defense imposes two requirements on employers, they must have (1) 
exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment (the ‘prevention prong’) and (2) promptly 
corrected any sexual harassment that did occur (the ‘correction prong’)”); see also, Shaw v. 
AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The first prong of the	Ellerth	affirmative 
defense also requires [the employer-defendant] to prove that it exercised reasonable care to 
respond to the sexual harassment.”). 
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have taken different approaches regarding what they view as necessary to 
satisfy the first prong of this element: the “prevention prong.”54 With regard 
to this prong, most courts have provided that evidence of implementation and 
dissemination of an anti-harassment policy can aid defendant-employers in 
satisfying this component.55 The Tenth Circuit has even found that evidence 
of implementation and dissemination of an anti-harassment policy is enough 
for the court to find that the employer satisfied the prevention prong as a 
matter of law, even if the employer “provided no [anti-]harassment training 
or provided training only to managers.”56 This application of the prevention 
prong is problematic because it does not help to encourage employers to 
implement deterrent measures, such as training programs, that can be 
enforced with the goal of preventing harassment in the workplace. 
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit has applied an approach that differs from 
other courts’ by providing a presumption that the “dissemination of ‘an 
effective anti-harassment policy provides compelling proof ’ that an employer 
has exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment.”57 
Plaintiff-employees can only rebut this presumption by providing evidence 
that the “employer adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad 
faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional.”58 
The Fourth Circuit is the only federal circuit that has implemented this 
approach that provides a presumption that the defendant-employer has 
satisfied the prevention prong. However, district courts in other jurisdictions 
have applied this logic.59 This approach creates an additional hurdle for 
 
54 Though some attention has been brought to a circuit split regarding whether the 
application of the second prong of the defense is necessary, see infra Section II.B, little attention 
has been brought to the different standards that federal courts have applied in evaluating the first 
prong of the defense. 
55 See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Lissau v. S. Food Servs., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998)) (noting 
“that	dissemination	of	‘an	effective	anti-harassment	policy	provides	compelling	proof ’	that	an 
employer	has	exercised reasonable	care	to	prevent	and	correct	sexual	harassment”); see also Reed 
v. MBNA Mktg. Sys. Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2003) (examining whether “reasonable 
precautions to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior by its employees” were 
taken by the defendant-employer); Macks v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(“One way for employers to demonstrate that they exercised reasonable care is to show that they 
had an anti-harassment policy in place.”); Shaw, 180 F.3d at 811 (noting that adopting and 
distributing a policy is sufficient). 
56 Stapp v. Curry Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 672 F. App’x 841, 849 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing 
Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 653 (10th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
57 Matvia, 259 F.3d at 268 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Lissau, 159 F.3d at 182); see also McKinnish v. 
Brennan, 630 F. App’x 177, 183 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting the same). 
58 Walton v. N.C. Dep’t of Agr. & Consumer Servs., 494 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Barret v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
59 See O’Dell v. Trans World Entm’t Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 378, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (explaining 
that if a defendant-employer provides evidence of a harassment policy to satisfy the first element of 
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plaintiff-employees to overcome, as this rebuttable presumption makes it 
easier for defendant-employers to meet the first element of this defense. For 
example, in McKinney v. G4S Government Solutions, Inc., the Western District 
of Virginia held that the plaintiff-employee “trie[d] to overcome this [burden] 
.	.	. by relying on his own testimony that there was little training on the 
[employer’s] policy, and no retraining, although the employees were asked to 
sign forms saying that they had been retrained” and that a supervisor 
threatened employees to not make anti-harassment complaints.60 However, 
the court still found that there was “simply insufficient evidence in the 
record from which a reasonable jury could find the policy was dysfunctional 
or adopted in bad faith.”61 
With regard to the second prong of the defense’s first element, the 
“correction prong,” federal courts have traditionally separated the analysis of 
whether the employer had taken reasonable correction measures from 
whether the employee had reported the instances of harassment to the 
employer.62 The Seventh Circuit has a comparatively high standard for 
employers to meet the correction prong, requiring that the corrective 
measures employers take “must be reasonably calculated to prevent further 
harassment under the particular facts and circumstances of the case at the 
time the allegations are made.”63 
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit has taken a different approach with 
respect to the correction prong by allowing the defense to circumvent its 
application in certain instances. The Eleventh Circuit has provided that “once 
an employer has promulgated an effective anti-harassment policy and 
disseminated that policy and associated procedures to its employees, then it 
is incumbent upon the employees to utilize the procedural mechanisms 
established by the company specifically to address problems and 
 
the defense, “[t]he employee may then rebut the employer’s proof by showing that the sexual 
harassment policy is not effective, which can be demonstrated .	.	. by evidence that the employer did 
not disseminate its policy to its employees.”); see also Hunt v. Wal-Mart, 931 F.3d 624, 630 (7th Cir. 
2019) (“An employer’s adoption of an effective anti-harassment policy is an important factor in 
determining whether it exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment.”); Aiello v. Stamford 
Hosp., No. 09-1161, 2011 WL 3439459, at *26 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2011) (finding that the defendant 
satisfied the first element of the defense because the defendant provided sufficient evidence that 
they had a harassment policy in place and the plaintiff failed to rebut this). 
60 179 F. Supp. 3d 609, 623 (W.D. Va. 2016). 
61 Id. 
62 See E.E.O.C. v. Cromer Food Servs. Inc., 414 F. App’x 602, 607 (4th Cir. 2011) (explicitly 
rejecting the approach of the Eleventh Circuit, explaining that “the Eleventh Circuit held that an 
employee who had not followed the anti-harassment policy had not effectively put the company on 
notice. This is not the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit”) (internal citation omitted). 
63 Cerros v. Steel Tech., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t 
of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
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grievances.”64 Once the policy has been distributed, the Eleventh Circuit 
seemingly allows courts to jump directly to the second element of the 
affirmative defense that analyzes whether the employee has “tak[en] 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer.”65 For example, in Scott v. Publix Supermarkets, the plaintiff alleged 
that her supervisor ordered the plaintiff to give him back rubs, asked the 
plaintiff “what she would do if he kissed her and what she would do if he 
walked her to her car, pressed her against it, and kissed her” and would “call 
across the parking lot for her to lift up her shirt,” among other conduct.66 The 
Southern District of Florida, relying on the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, 
found it unnecessary to analyze the correction prong because the plaintiff did 
not report the harassment to the store managers.67 The court jumped to its 
analysis of the second element of the affirmative defense as a result.68 
Permitting courts to skip their analysis of the correction prong creates 
another safeguard for the defense that defendant-employers can use to meet 
the preponderance standard. This exemplifies how a plaintiff-employee may 
be more likely to face a grant of summary judgment if she files her claim in 
the Eleventh Circuit as opposed to elsewhere. 
Furthermore, in considering the first element in its entirety, some courts 
have found that it is not necessary for both the prevention and correction 
methods the employer has implemented to be successful to satisfy the first 
element. Specifically, some courts have held that merely an attempt by the 
employer to address the problem is sufficient. For example, the Second 
Circuit has held that “[a]n employer need not prove success in preventing 
harassing behavior in order to demonstrate that it exercised reasonable care 
in preventing and correcting sexually harassing conduct.”69 This does not 
serve to deter harassment or encourage employers to take firm measures to 
prevent harassment in the workplace but merely provides them with a safety 
valve to escape liability in an instance in which an employee has been the 
 
64 Cooper v. CLP Corp., 679 F. App’x 851, 855 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Madray v. Publix 
Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also Jones v. Allstate Ins. Co., 707 F. App’x 
641, 649 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting the same, though briefly describing a corrective measure the defendant-
employer took); Nichols v. Volunteers of Am., N. Ala., Inc., No. 08-S-501, 2013 WL 1767803, at *3 (N.D. 
Ala. Apr. 24, 2013) (finding that the “defendant exercised reasonable care in preventing harassment 
based upon the existence, content, and dissemination of its anti-harassment policy”). 
65 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). 
66 No. 07-60624, 2008 WL 2940672, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2008). 
67 Id. at *7. 
68 Id. at *7-8. 
69 Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Caridad v. Metro-North 
Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added); see Steffy v. Ford Motor Co., 
No. 04-319S, 2007 WL 895506, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2007) (noting this and finding that 
existence of a policy was sufficient to satisfy the first element of the defense). 
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victim of appalling behavior. This is again representative of the inconsistent 
manner in which circuit courts have applied the first element of the defense. 
B. Inconsistent Application of the Second Element of the Affirmative Defense 
Several federal circuit courts have found it unnecessary to examine the 
second element of the affirmative defense in certain instances, providing 
further evidence of how federal courts have incongruously applied this 
defense. Scholarship has detailed this circuit split, noting that some “courts 
hold that employers must prove only the first [element] of the defense in 
order to prevail when there has been a single, severe incident of harassment” 
while others apply the whole defense in all instances.70 
To contextualize this circuit split, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have 
dropped the first element in cases of “rapid-onset harassment” in which there 
was a single, typically severe, instance of harassment, rather than a case in 
which there are repeated instances of harassment by a supervisor.71 For 
example, in Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., the plaintiff-employee alleged 
that while she was attending a work convention over a four-day period, her 
supervisor made a series of “crude sexual comments and sexual gestures” to 
her, and the plaintiff reported the incidents to her manager and human 
resources director upon returning.72 The company issued a warning to the 
plaintiff ’s supervisor and suspended the supervisor for seven days without 
pay.73 The plaintiff subsequently brought a hostile work environment claim 
against her employer, and the employer raised the affirmative Faragher-Ellerth 
defense.74 The Fifth Circuit granted summary judgment finding that the 
defendant-employer satisfied the first element of the affirmative defense, 
holding that “a case presenting only an incipient hostile environment 
corrected by prompt remedial action should be distinct from a case in which 
 
70 Natalie S. Neals, Comment, Flirting with the Law: An Analysis of the Ellerth/Faragher Circuit 
Split and a Prediction of the Seventh Circuit’s Stance, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 167, 171 (2013); see also id. at 184-
86; Charles W. Garrison, Once Is Enough: The Need to Apply the Full Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative 
Defense in Single Incident and Incipient Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 61 CATH. 
U. L. REV. 1131, 1145 (2012); Graham, supra note 29, at 430-34; John H. Marks, Smoke, Mirrors, and the 
Disappearance of Vicarious Liability: The Emergency of a Dubious Summary-Judgment Safe Harbor for 
Employers Whose Supervisory Personnel Commit Hostile Environment Workplace Harassment, 38 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1401, 1439 (2002). 
71 See McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 774 (8th Cir. 2004); Indest v. Freeman 
Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Neals, supra note 70, at 182-83. 
72 Indest, 164 F.3d at 260. 
73 Id. at 261. After learning of Indest’s intent to file charges with the EEOC, the company 
issued a written statement that confirmed the actions the company took and wrote to the supervisor 
that “[the company is] particularly concerned that there never [was] any discriminatory action taken 
against Connie Indest in retaliation [for] her complaint. It is vitally important that there be no 
future instances of sexual harassment of our employees by you.” Id. 
74 Id. 
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a company was never called upon to react to a supervisor’s protracted or 
extremely severe acts that created a hostile environment.”75 
Other courts have explicitly rejected this approach. For example, in 
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that “the reasoning of 
Indest is highly suspect and, in our view, should not be adopted” as “there is 
no reason to believe that the ‘remarkably straightforward’ framework outlined 
in Faragher and Burlington does not control all cases in which a plaintiff 
employee seeks to hold his or her employer vicariously liable for a supervisor’s 
sexual harassment.”76 
This circuit split is representative of another way in which the affirmative 
defense has been inconsistently applied across circuits. Circuit courts’ refusal 
to apply the defense in instances of single cases of harassment is problematic 
as it allows an employer to avoid liability in a potentially egregious, albeit 
standalone, instance of harassment. Scholars have noted that in courts’ refusal 
to apply the full defense, “an employer who exercises reasonable care in 
responding to a complaint of sexual harassment will be able to prevail on the 
affirmative defense and avoid liability even if the conduct was severe or 
pervasive.”77 A plaintiff ’s claim should not fail simply because harassment 
occurred during only one instance.78 In standard cases of vicarious liability, 
 
75 Id. at 265, 267. Similarly, in McCurdy v. Ark. State Police, the Eighth Circuit also declined to 
apply the second element of the defense cases of rapid-onset harassment. 375 F.3d 762, 772 (8th Cir. 
2004). In this case, the plaintiff worked as a radio dispatcher; one evening, her supervisor came in 
and “cupped, touched, [and] brushed against” her left breast, and told her that if he were in charge 
“[her] uniform would be panties and a tank top,” among other comments. Id. at 764. The plaintiff 
reported the behavior, and the plaintiff ’s employer conducted an investigation and terminated the 
supervisor’s employment over two months later; however, the supervisor’s employment was 
subsequently reinstated and he was transferred to a different unit. Id. at 766-67. The employer 
invoked the affirmative defense, and the Eighth Circuit held that because the defendant-employer 
promptly responded to the allegation, it would be inappropriate to follow the Faragher-Ellerth 
defense as outlined by the Supreme Court, and that the reviewing employer’s response alone (the 
first element of the defense) was sufficient to grant summary judgment. Id. at 774. 
76 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Alade v. AWS Assistance Corp., 796 F. Supp. 
2d 936, 946 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (also upholding both elements of the defense). The EEOC appears to 
support this position as well. See Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for 
Unlawful Harassment by Supervisors, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html [https://perma.cc/MC7Q-P3C5] (noting that 
“[t]he employer will be shielded from liability for harassment by a supervisor only if it proves that 
it exercised reasonable care in preventing and correcting the harassment	and	that the employee 
unreasonably failed to avoid all of the harm”); Neals, supra note 70, at 190 (explaining that the EEOC 
endorses application of both elements in all circumstances). 
77 David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel Your ‘1-800’ Harassment Hotline: 
An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment 
Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1295-96 (2001). 
78 As has been noted, “[i]n gradual-onset cases, a judge should rarely be able to decide, as a 
matter of law, that the reasonable person, given all the circumstances, necessarily would have 
regarded the abuse threshold as crossed with the supervisor’s first antic, or the second one, or the 
third one, and so on.” Marks, supra note 70, at 1449. 
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even if the supervisor committed an intentional tort in a single instance, the 
employer can be held liable.79 Holding otherwise cuts against the aim to deter 
workplace harassment, and such an approach should not be condoned. 
C. The Unreasonable Application of the Second Element 
Federal courts frequently hold that if a plaintiff-employee waits, or 
declines to, report an instance of harassment to her employer, the plaintiff is 
unreasonable as a matter of law under the second element of the defense. 
However, the affirmative defense does not provide that an employee must 
report an allegation of harassment within a specific timeframe, which has left 
plaintiffs with an unclear standard as to what amounts to an unreasonable 
delay in reporting. Further, courts have held that the employees are 
unreasonable by failing to follow the precise reporting procedures in their 
employee policies and have failed to consider that plaintiffs may have a 
justifiable reason for waiting to report. In coming to these decisions, courts 
do not consider the psychological trauma incidents of harassment can have 
on a victim which may contribute to a plaintiff ’s reason for delaying to report 
an allegation of harassment. This further represents why a new standard is 
needed when examining these claims. 
1. Courts Find That Delays in Reporting Are Unreasonable                                  
as a Matter of Law 
As noted, the second element of the affirmative defense requires the court 
to consider how reasonable a plaintiff-employee was in taking advantage of 
the preventative opportunities the employer offers. Though the defense was 
aimed at preventing harm and deterring sexual harassment, many courts have 
held that employee-plaintiffs’ delays in reporting instances of harassment to 
their employers are unreasonable as a matter of law.80 Scholars have noted 
that “[a]s a general matter, courts have strictly enforced the victim’s duty to 
complain.”81 In many instances, federal courts have held that the plaintiff-
 
79 See, e.g., Spurlock v. Townes, 661 F. App’x 536, 540 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that “an 
employer may be held liable for the intentional torts of an employee—even if the employee was 
acting outside the scope of his or her employment—if the employee ‘was aided in accomplishing the 
tort by the existence of the agency relation’”). 
80 See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance 
in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 21 (2003) (“Cases analyzing this prong of the 
affirmative defense have focused on whether the victim made correct use of the grievance 
procedures, how long the victim waited to complain, and whether a victim who failed to complain 
had any justification for her silence.”). 
81 Id.; see also Venuti, supra note 25, at 551 (explaining that “an employer can usually establish 
the second prong if it can show that the employee delayed acting upon an anti-harassment policy”). 
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employee was unreasonable for waiting a few weeks or a few months to report 
an instance of harassment.82 
For example, in July of 2019, the Seventh Circuit found that a plaintiff-
employee was unreasonable as a matter of law for waiting for months to report 
an instance of harassment.83 In Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, the plaintiff-
employee, Tristana Hunt, alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed her on 
a daily basis for over five months.84 Hunt’s supervisor, Daniel Watson, 
frequently asked to see her breasts, telling “her he wanted to shower with her 
and feel her breasts.”85 After four months of experiencing frequent 
harassment, Hunt reported Watson’s conduct to the store manager. The 
manager “concluded [that] Hunt’s claims could not be substantiated without 
corroborating witnesses” and merely required Hunt’s supervisor to retake an 
ethics course even though another employee had previously made a similar 
complaint against Watson.86 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that “employees 
have a duty to utilize reporting mechanisms provided by their employer, or 
otherwise alert their employer of the problem,” and found that because Hunt 
failed to take advantage of Wal-Mart’s reporting systems for four months, she 
acted unreasonably.87 Courts have frequently held that delays are 
unreasonable as a matter of law without considering the toll harassment can 
take on plaintiff-employees and giving credence to the reasons they may 
hesitate to report.88 Further, such decisions to hold such delays unreasonable 
 
82 A study conducted in 2001 that reviewed the first seventy-two published decisions that 
invoked the Faragher-Ellerth defense found that in a dozen of those cases “courts found plaintiffs to 
have acted unreasonably because they delayed reporting the harassment. In some cases, there was a 
delay of one year or more between the first harassing actions and the report. In other cases, however, 
the delay was a matter of months or even weeks.” Sherwyn et al., supra note 77, at 1297. 
83 Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2019). 
84 Id. at 627. 
85 Id. at 626. 
86 Id. at 626-27. 
87 Id. at 631. Similarly, in Williams v. United Launch Alliance, the plaintiff alleged that her 
supervisor made frequent sexual comments and facial gestures towards her; at one point, her 
supervisor “approached [her] from behind as she returned to her workstation .	.	. and informed her 
that he was doing a ‘butt block’ .	.	. so nobody else could see it. 286 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1299 (N.D. 
Ala. 2018). At another point, he told her that employees in another department would want to see 
her “down on all fours,” and he frequently made other similarly lewd comments. Id. at 1300. The 
court held that because the plaintiff did not strictly comply with the employer’s policy that detailed 
employees should promptly report harassment “preferably within three business days of the 
conduct,” and because the employee waited sixteen months since the harassment began, and four 
months after the employee experienced the most recent incident of harassment, the delay was 
unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 1309-10. Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant-employer. Id. at 1311. 
88 See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Potter, 219 F. App’x 500, 504-05 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding a seven 
month delay unreasonable as a matter of law); see also Christian v. AHS Tulsa Reg’l Med., LLC, 430 
F. App’x 694, 700 (10th Cir. 2011) (finding that waiting until October to report incidents of 
harassment that occurred between January and May was unreasonable); Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of 
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as a matter of law have been criticized as “typically treat[ing] these 
purportedly unreasonable delays as something akin to contributory 
negligence—a complete bar to recovery.”89 
However, some lower courts have found delays within similar timeframes 
to be reasonable. For example, in Chin-McKenzie v. Continuum Health 
Partners, the Southern District of New York declined to grant summary 
judgment even though the plaintiff-employee waited five months to report 
her allegations of harassment.90 These inconsistent standards are problematic 
since the Supreme Court has never provided a bright-line rule as to what is 
considered a justifiable delay in reporting. This makes it difficult for plaintiffs 
to predict what courts will deem to be a reasonable response.91 
Furthermore, in instances where plaintiffs report but fail to comply with 
the specifics of their employer’s reporting procedure, or when plaintiffs provide 
a justification for waiting to report, courts are still hesitant to find that this 
validates plaintiffs’ claims. As will be explained, in these instances, courts may 
still grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer even when 
the plaintiff ’s rationale seems reasonable. 
2. Dismissal of Complaints if Plaintiff-Employees Do Not Strictly Adhere 
to Employer’s Reporting Procedure 
Courts, particularly in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, have 
frequently found that plaintiffs’ delays in reporting were unreasonable as a 
matter of law because they did not follow the exact procedure specified in 
the defendant-employer’s anti-harassment policy.92 The Eleventh Circuit 
 
Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1064 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding a two-and-a-half month delay to be 
unreasonable); Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1307 (11th Cir. 2007) 
(holding a three-month delay unreasonable as a matter of law); Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Serv., 
Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1293 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding a two-and-a-half month delay to be unreasonable); 
Bennet v. K-Mart Corp., 10 F. App’x 520, 521-22 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding a four-month delay 
unreasonable as a matter of law); Macias v. Sw. Cheese Co., LLC, 181 F. Supp. 3d 883, 896 (D.N.M. 
2016) (holding a five-month delay to be unreasonable). 
89 Marks, supra note 70, at 1429. 
90 876 F. Supp. 2d 270, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The court noted that they were “unaware of any 
case holding a 5–month, or shorter,	delay	in taking advantage of a sexual harassment policy to 
preclude liability as a matter of law.” Id; see also United States v. Henry Cty., No. 09-4015, 2010 WL 
3199687, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2010) (declining to grant summary judgment though one employee 
waited six months after the first instance of harassment to report). 
91 See supra note 88. 
92 See, e.g., Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 5 F. App’x 239, 244-245 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
“evidence that the plaintiff failed to utilize the company’s complaint procedure will normally suffice 
to satisfy [the company’s] burden under the second element of the defense”); Madray v. Publix 
Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1301 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting the same); see also Kerri Lynn Stone, 
Consenting Adults?: Why Women Who Submit to Supervisory Sexual Harassment Are Faring Better in 
Court than Those Who Say No .	.	. and Why They Shouldn’t, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 25, 58 (2008) 
(explaining that “courts often adhere rigidly to the requirement that plaintiffs follow the exact course 
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has held that “once an employer has promulgated an effective anti-
harassment policy and disseminated that policy and associated procedures 
to its employees, then it is incumbent upon the employees to utilize the 
procedural mechanisms established by the company specifically to address 
problems and grievances.”93 
For example, in Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, although the plaintiff told 
multiple assistant managers and a manager of another department that her 
supervisor would inappropriately hug, touch, and kiss her, because the 
plaintiff did not complain to the store, district, or divisional manager per her 
employer’s anti-harassment policy, she was found to have acted unreasonably 
as a matter of law.94 Similarly, in Cooper v. CLP Corp., the Eleventh Circuit 
found that the plaintiff ’s delay in reporting was unreasonable as a matter of 
law because although he reported his allegations of harassment to the 
defendant-employer’s district manager, the district manager “was not one of 
the company representatives to whom [the plaintiff] was supposed to report 
harassment under the policy” so this complaint was not sufficient.95 
Finding that such plaintiffs, even those who informally complained, were 
unreasonable as a matter of law does not work to deter workplace harassment. 
In such cases, even if an employee felt comfortable reporting that harassment 
to someone in the company, courts have found this to be insufficient. When 
federal courts misconstrue the circumstances to grant summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant-employer, they prevent the actualization of the goal of 
encouraging employees to report. 
3. Courts’ Unwillingness to Consider Plaintiffs’ Rationale for Waiting to 
Report Instances of Harassment 
Even if a plaintiff has a justified reason for delaying to report, courts are 
quick to dismiss these rationales in considering the second element of the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense. Women may fear that they will be fired, demoted, 
treated adversely at work, or subjected to social ostracization because “no one 
will believe them, or .	.	. reporting will make the situation at work worse.”96 
 
of action prescribed by a defendant’s policy, even if a plaintiff acted in a manner that was reasonably 
calculated or likely to put the defendant on actual notice of harassment requiring correction”). 
93 Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300 (internal quotations omitted). 
94 Id. at 1293, 1300. 
95 679 F. App’x 851, 855 (11th Cir. 2017). 
96 Anne Lawton, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Perils of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 9 U. 
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 603, 618-19 (2007); Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting 
with Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 51 (2018); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of 
Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 1, 23 (2003) (“Sexual harassment victims have traditionally tended not to utilize internal complaint 
procedures or otherwise formally report problems of harassment.”). 
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Studies have found that “a common reaction by victims is to ignore the 
harassment or take ‘costly steps’ to avoid the harasser or the job” such that the 
“least frequent response is to report.”97 Such fears are not unsubstantiated, as 
one study found that upwards of 75% of women who have reported instances 
of harassment in the workplace were retaliated against by their employer.98 
However, federal courts have repeatedly held that “[a] generalized fear of 
retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment.”99 Courts 
have held that to substantiate her claims, the employee-plaintiff must provide 
specific, credible evidence that she will be retaliated against, and failure to do 
so will result in the employer-defendant satisfying the second element of the 
defense.100 Despite this, even in instances in which an employee provided 
evidence to support her fear of retaliation, many courts have discredited that 
evidence and granted judgment for the employer as a matter of law.101 
For example, in Terry v. Laurel Oaks Behavioral Health Center, the plaintiff 
alleged that her supervisor propositioned her to engage in sexual activity 
 
97 Porter, supra note 96, at 51. 
98 Feldblum & Lipnic, supra note 7, at 16 (citing Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising 
Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8(4) J. 
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 255 (2003)); see also Hebert, supra note 45, at 741 (“[S]tudies 
of women who have made complaints of sexual harassment demonstrate that such women have often 
faced retaliation, including ostracization by their coworkers, loss of opportunities for advancement, 
transfer to less desirable positions, and even loss of employment.”). 
99 Dowdy v. North Carolina, 23 F. App’x 121, 123 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Barrett v. Applied 
Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001)); see also, e.g., McKinney v. G4S Gov’t Sol., 
Inc., 711 F. App’x 130, 137 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting fear of retaliation does not relieve duty to report); 
Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (same); Adams v. O’Reilly Auto., 
Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 F. App’x 883, 888 
(11th Cir. 2006) (same); An v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 94 F. App’x 667, 675 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 284 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001)) (same); Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., 
Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). 
100 See, e.g., Reed v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., Inc., 333 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that “for 
policy reasons representing a compromise, more than ordinary fear or embarrassment is needed” to 
substantiate such a claim); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(noting that the plaintiff ’s reasons for waiting to report instances of harassment “[were] not based 
on a credible fear that .	.	. she would suffer some adverse employment action as a result of filing a 
complaint”); see also Thornton, 530 F.3d at 457 (citing Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 
F.3d 1272, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2003)) (noting that the plaintiff did not provide evidence that she was 
subject to a “credible threat of retaliation”); Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 F. App’x 883, 888 
(11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that because the plaintiff only asserted a “generalized	fear	of	retaliation, 
and the record offer[ed] no objective evidence to substantiate her fear,” the defendant-employer 
satisfied the second element of the defense). But see Venuti, supra note 25, at 554 (explaining that 
“[i]n situations where plaintiffs assert that a subjective fear prevented them from promptly reporting 
harassment, courts typically seek evidence of a credible threat”). 
101 See Hebert, supra note 45, at 725 (“Courts have generally rejected the contentions of 
employees that they justifiably delayed reporting sexual harassment because of their fears of 
retaliation. Even courts that have expressed a willingness to consider [it] .	.	. have insisted on 
objective evidence of the likelihood of retaliatory conduct.”). 
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several times, among other comments.102 However, the court found that 
because the plaintiff waited six months to report the harassment after the first 
alleged incident, her delay in reporting was unreasonable as a matter of law, 
even though she explained that she delayed reporting out of fear of losing her 
job.103 After reporting the harassment, the plaintiff was fired, as she predicted 
and feared, “when she refused to sign a counseling form based upon alleged 
misconduct arising from an [unrelated] incident”; this may have provided 
objective, circumstantial evidence that her fears were substantiated.104 
The Second Circuit has even gone a step further by explicitly instituting 
a burden-shifting analysis, not promulgated by the Supreme Court, that 
further places the onus on the victim. The Second Circuit has held that 
“[o]nce an employer has satisfied its initial burden of demonstrating that an 
employee has completely failed to avail herself of the complaint procedure, 
the burden of production shifts to the employee to come forward with one or 
more reasons why the employee did not make use of the procedures.”105 In 
Eichler v. American Intern Group, Inc., for example, the plaintiff alleged that 
her immediate supervisor, Vince Corteselli, frequently made sexist remarks 
to her,106 and the court held that the employer still satisfied the second 
element of the defense.107 The court reasoned that because the plaintiff waited 
approximately a year until she officially reported the harassment to human 
resources, she breached “her ‘obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm.’”108 
 
102 1 F. Supp. 3d 1250, 1258-59 (M.D. Ala. 2014). The plaintiff also alleged that her supervisor 
“wrapped his arm around her neck, while asking her why she would not come to his house” and that 
“he accused her of playing hard to get and told her that he was going to keep trying until she ‘gave 
in’ to him.” Id. The plaintiff ’s supervisor also made many other inappropriate comments such as 
approaching her and “look[ing] at his genitals while remarking, ‘[y]ou see what you do to me?’” and 
sitting next to her during meetings and bumping his leg against the plaintiff ’s despite her asking 
him to stop. Id. at 1259. 
103 Id. at 1275. The plaintiff argued that she delayed reporting instances of harassment because 
she believed that human resources fired employees without just reason. Id. 
104 Id. at 1262, 1275. 
105 Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001). 
106 No. 05-5167, 2007 WL 963279, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (internal citations omitted). 
The plaintiff alleged that Cortieselli made comments such as, “You have tits. Just cry,” “if he and 
[plaintiff] were in Iran, he ‘would be able to stone [her] to death because [she] was a woman,’” 
and	”‘Why don’t you find a husband and go get married[?] Like, get out of here. Don’t be in the 
work force.’” Id. Additionally, he frequently told her that she was “stupid,” cursed at her, and told 
her that “‘[she] could make mistakes because she had breasts,’” among other comments. Id. at *4-5. 
107 Id. at *12-13. 
108 Id. at *11 (citing Barua v. Credit-Lyonnais, No. 97-7991, 1998 WL 915892, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 30, 1998)). The court also reasoned that although the plaintiff complained in writing to 
managers senior to Corteselli twice, the complaints did not refer to sexual harassment but only to 
disrespectful conduct. For example, the plaintiff reported that Cortesselli “repeatedly shouted that 
[the plaintiff] should ‘shut the fuck up and get the fuck out of his office.’” Id. at *10. The court 
dismissed these concerns by stating that this evidence “added nothing to Corteselli’s statement other 
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Furthermore, the court stated that because the plaintiff did not bring credible 
evidence that she feared retaliation, such as “evidence to the effect that the 
employer has ignored or resisted similar complaints or has taken adverse 
actions against employees in response to such complaints,” the employer-
defendant had met its burden of the defense.109 
Courts have justified such reasoning by explaining that “advancing a 
speculative ‘fear of retaliation’ .	.	. would undermine the primary objective 
of Title VII and could result in more, not less, sexual harassment going 
undetected.”110 But requiring substantive evidence to support a fear of 
retaliation actually has the opposite effect. It propagates the notion that 
women’s claims of harassment should not be believed, even when studies 
have affirmatively found that reporting claims of harassment has led 
employees to experience instances of retaliation, justifying their silence.111 
One study that analyzed responses of 1,167 participants regarding their 
experiences with reporting harassment found that, compared with those who 
did not report, “those who voiced against their wrongdoers either directly or 
indirectly (to colleagues) generally experienced more [social retaliation 
victimization]” such as harassment, name-calling, ostracism, and threats.112 
It is apparent that these fears are not merely speculative. Furthermore, rather 
than encouraging women to report, this approach may actually impede 
reporting, as victims may decide that reporting is not worthwhile because 
their claims of harassment will likely be dismissed. Thus, this is also 
representative of how the second element of the affirmative defense has been 
problematically applied. 
 
than an indication that he	really	wanted [the plaintiff] to be quiet and leave. It thus was merely an 
intensifier.” Id. 
109 Id. at *12-13; see also Delgado v. City of Stamford, No. 11-01735, 2015 WL 6675534, at *31 
(D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2015) (finding that although the plaintiff showed evidence that “may give rise 
to a reasonable inference that Plaintiff feared that [the supervisor] would retaliate if she 
complained to his superiors” regarding one instance of alleged harassment, this did not “give rise 
to a reasonable inference that Plaintiff feared that [the supervisor] would retaliate if she 
complained about the alleged harassment that forms the basis of her hostile work environment 
claim”). But see Venuti, supra note 25, at 556 (citing Leopold v. Baccart, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 
(2d Cir. 2001)) (explaining that “[t]he Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a 
credible fear may be established if the ‘employer has ignored or resisted similar complaints’”). 
110 Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001). 
111 See Bergman et al., infra note 119 and related discussion. 
112 Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following 
Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 248, 
259 (2003). 
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4. The Invalidation of Victims’ Responses to Harassment Fails to Consider 
the Psychological Impact Harassment Can Have on Victims               
and Fails to Support the Goal of Deterring Harassment 
Regardless, courts’ decisions to find plaintiffs’ delays in reporting are 
problematic as they fail to consider the psychological impact harassment can 
have on victims. Courts are quick to jump to the conclusion that the dread 
one may experience when reporting is insufficient to justify a failure to report 
harassment. In doing so, courts have explained that though matters related to 
harassment “are of a delicate nature .	.	. [,] this ‘inevitable unpleasantness’ 
cannot excuse an employee from taking advantage of [the] employer’s 
complaint procedure.’”113 Such reasoning fails to consider how this impact 
may discourage women from reporting. 
In Butler v. Maryland Aviation Administration, the plaintiff alleged that she 
was harassed by both of her supervisors: one supervisor stood, unannounced, 
outside of her home “at odd hours of the day and night,” and the other 
touched her genitals, called her sexual names, and described his sexual 
preferences to her in a graphic manner.114 The court granted summary 
judgment for the defendant-employer, and found that the employer satisfied 
the second element of the defense because the plaintiff-employee endured 
harassment for over a year without reporting it.115 The court explicitly noted 
that it could not consider the “unpleasantness” associated with reporting a 
claim of harassment, thus allowing the defendant-employer to escape liability 
despite the unacceptable conduct by the plaintiff ’s supervisors.116 The courts 
have failed to give due consideration to the extent to which harassment can 
cause anxiety for victims, noting that “an employee’s subjective fears of 
confrontation [and] unpleasantness .	.	. do not alleviate the employee’s duty 
under	Ellerth	to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environment.”117 
 
113 Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 5 F. App’x 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Barret, 240 F.3d 
at 268); see also Johnson v. Holder, No. 10-1222, 2013 WL 787667, at *12 (D.S.C. Jan. 16, 2013) 
(noting the same); Butler v. Maryland Aviation Admin., No. 11-2854, 2012 WL 3541985, at *7 
(D. Md. Aug. 14, 2012) (noting the same). 
114 Butler, 2012 WL 3541985, at *1. 
115 Id. at *7. 
116 Id. 
117 Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Mo. 
Dep’t of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2005)); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 
813 (7th Cir. 1999). See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 270 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that “[w]hile such events might cause an employee stress, the unpleasantness cannot 
override the duty to report sexual harassment.”); see also Howard v. City of Robertsdale, 168 F. App’x 
883, 888 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that fears of confrontation or unpleasantness do not alleviate a duty 
to report); McInnis v. Fairfield Cmtys., Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1141 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting the same); 
Williams, 407 F.3d at 977 (same); Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(same); Carroll v. ATA Retail Serv., Inc., No. 14-00747, 2016 WL 8417377, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 
2016) (same); Moncel v. Sullivan’s of Ind., Inc., No. 12-1720, 2014 WL 1905485, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May 
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Relying on such reasoning is problematic as it discounts “the stark 
realities of being a harassment victim and feeling isolated, mistrusted, and 
fearful” as well as traumatized.118 Studies have found that victims of 
harassment may suffer forms of psychological distress from reporting.119 It is 
possible that these effects contribute to the underreporting of harassment 
claims. A study that analyzed the longitudinal effects of harassment on mental 
health found that “harassment is a stressor that has a positive and linear 
relationship with depressive affect” and that there is “evidence that 
harassment early in the career has long-term effects on depressive symptoms 
in adulthood.”120 The study noted that the stress of harassment may lead to 
“feelings of anger, self-blame, and self-doubt” and “may diminish coping 
resources, such as self-esteem and mastery.”121 Researchers have found that 
“harassment victims are likely to have similar psychological symptoms as 
those who experience traumatic events” and that victims of harassment have 
had other negative physical side effects such as sleep disturbances and 
gastrointestinal disorders.122 The effects harassment can have on mental 
health may contribute to why seventy percent of victims of workplace 
harassment “never even talk[] with a supervisor, manager, or union 
representative about the harassing conduct” and are more likely to confide in 
a family member or friend.123 
Further, courts’ disregard of the psychological toll harassment can take on 
victims and their reasons for hesitating to report is especially problematic 
because the Supreme Court has held that the defense is available when an 
employee has been constructively discharged. If a plaintiff alleges she was 
constructively discharged, the plaintiff “must show that the abusive working 
environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting 
 
13, 2014) (same); Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 375, 385 (W.D.N.C. 2012) (same); Butler, 
2012 WL 3541985, at *7 (same). 
118 Stone, supra note 92, at 50. 
119 Mindy E. Bergman et al., The (Un)reasonableness of Reporting: Antecedents and Consequences 
of Reporting Sexual Harassment, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 230, 237 (2002); see also Linda L. 
Collinsworth, et al., In Harm’s Way: Factors Related to Psychological Distress Following Sexual 
Harassment, 33 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 475, 485 (2009) (explaining that “[s]ocial science research has 
repeatedly documented a connection between sexually harassing experiences and negative 
psychological outcomes”); Jason N. Houle et al., The Impact of Sexual Harassment on Depressive 
Symptoms During the Early Occupational Career, 1 SOC. & MENTAL HEALTH 89, 90 (2011), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3227029/ [https://perma.cc/4KAM-RGJ5] 
(explaining that psychologists have “theorize[d] that sexual harassment is a stressor that can lead to 
work withdrawal, career instability, job dissatisfaction, and poor mental and physical health”). 
120 Houle, supra note 119, at 101. 
121 Id. at 102. 
122 Darius K-S. Chan et al., Examining the Job-Related, Psychological, and Physical Outcomes of 
Workplace Sexual Harassment: A Meta-Analytic Review, 32 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 362, 363 (2008). 
123 Feldblum & Lipnic, supra note 7, at 23; see also id. (noting that “sexually coercive behavior 
was reported by only 30% of the women who experienced it.”). 
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response.”124	In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, the Supreme Court held 
that constructive discharge alone is not a tangible employment action, and 
thus an employer-defendant can raise the defense not only when an employee 
leaves a place of employment on their own volition, but also in circumstances 
in which they feel that they are subject to a workplace so hostile, they have 
no choice but to resign.125 Thus, an employee who experiences the traumatic 
effects of harassment may feel forced to leave, and the employer may still be 
able to escape liability by raising the affirmative defense. 
For example, in Wahlman v. DataSphere Technologies, the plaintiffs alleged 
that their supervisors repeatedly sent them sexually explicit e-mails and 
messages, verbally abused them, and continually called them derogatory and 
sexist names.126 After one supervisor was not disciplined for having a verbal 
outburst, he remarked that “he was ‘untouchable’ and that he could do 
whatever he wanted”; the harassment continued after the plaintiffs’ 
supervisor made these remarks.127 The plaintiffs argued that they were 
constructively discharged because they felt compelled to resign due to the 
hostile work environment.128 The court still granted the defendant-
employer’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the defendant was 
entitled to the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense.129 The court found that 
the second element was also satisfied because the employees never reported 
the harassment; however, the employment policy problematically required 
the plaintiffs to report the harassment to one of the supervisors engaging in 
the inappropriate conduct.130 Thus, the court was unwilling to consider the 
plaintiffs’ rationale even in an instance where the plaintiffs felt forced out of 
their workplace by the harassment. 
Further, in failing to consider the psychological impact harassment can 
have on victims, courts are failing to support the policy goals of Title VII.131 
As noted, in establishing the affirmative defense, the Court in Faragher and 
Ellerth sought to promote a policy that encouraged women to report 
 
124 Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004). 
125 Id. at 152. 
126 No. 12-1997, 2014 WL 794269, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2014). 
127 Id. at *2. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at *9. 
130 Id. The court found that the first element of the defense was satisfied because the 
defendant-employer had a harassment policy and had provided written and verbal warnings to one 
supervisor. Id. 
131 See Venuti, supra note 25, at 564 (“Courts granting summary judgment in favor of an 
employer without fully considering the context that may cause a reporting delay is contrary to the 
purpose of Title VII.”). 
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instances of harassment.132 Federal courts have emphasized the importance 
of notice, explaining that “[t]he law against sexual harassment is not self-
enforcing and an employer cannot be expected to correct harassment unless 
the employee makes a concerted effort to inform the employer that a 
problem exists.”133 Through this, courts have placed an “obligation to use 
reasonable care to avoid harm” on the victim.134 
Applying such reasoning blames a victim for failing to report and does 
not encourage employers to take a proactive view to deter harassment in the 
workplace. Though courts have argued that excusing a delay in reporting 
would be inconsistent with the goals of Title VII,135 it fails to give credence 
to plaintiffs’ claims and does not serve to deter harm. 
Overall, courts’ disregard of both plaintiffs’ reasons for delaying to report 
and the psychological impact of harassment highlights the problematic 
application of this defense. 
III. #METOO AND A RECOGNIZED NEED FOR CHANGES IN THE LAW  
RELATED TO WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 
Considering the manner in which federal circuits apply both elements of 
the defense, it is evident that employee-victims face numerous obstacles in 
bringing their claims. In the immediate aftermath of Ellerth and Faragher, 
scholars opined on the effect these decisions would have on plaintiff-
employee claims as it became apparent that “[t]he Ellerth defense is supposed 
to impose upon employers the burden of proof under a conjunctively framed 
two-pronged test, and both prongs of this test raise numerous, typically fact-
sensitive questions about ‘reasonableness’ that one would think are generally 
 
132 The Court in Faragher promoted the policy interests reflected in a 1990 EEOC statement 
that noted employers should implement policies “designed to encourage victims of harassment to 
come forward [without requiring] a victim to complain first to the offending supervisor.” Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). 
133 Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001); see also 
Pinkerton v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 563 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying this reasoning to 
justify the defendant-employer’s fulfillment of the second prong of the defense, even though she 
waited only two months to report instances of harassment); Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 
246 (2d Cir. 2001) (placing the burden on plaintiff-employees to provide justified reasons for failure 
to report harassment); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that “the 
law of sexual harassment is not self-enforcing”); Payne v. Great Plains Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 348 
F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1202 (N.D. Okla. 2018) (“As the Tenth Circuit has explained, adequate notice of 
the sexually harassing conduct is a necessary precursor to trigger an employer’s duty to take 
corrective action.”). 
134 Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003). 
135 See, e.g., Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 5 F. App’x 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 
“the effects of excusing failures to report would be far reaching and inconsistent with Title VII’s goal 
of purging the workplace of sexual harassment”). 
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best suited for juries.”136 In the current era, over twenty years after the 
Supreme Court upheld the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, it is time to 
revisit its application. In the wake of #MeToo, courts should place a greater 
focus on the reasonableness of the plaintiff and provide more weight to the 
credibility of their claims. Overall, it is time to redefine what reasonableness 
means in the context of this affirmative defense. 
A. The Influence of the #MeToo Movement 
The #MeToo movement has shed greater light on the detrimental effects 
harassment can have on women. The movement has given “a microphone to 
victims willing to share their experiences of harassment. It showcased the 
lasting impact an act of [harassment]” can have.137 In addition to bringing 
international attention to the issue, the movement has begun to influence the 
legal sphere as well. 
Currently, many states are passing, or seeking to pass, legislation that 
affects non-disclosure and non-disparagement provisions.138 For example, “a 
broad non-disparagement provision could restrict a party from making even 
truthful statements about the other if that would adversely affect the other’s 
reputation.”139 Because many employers require new hires to sign agreements 
that include such provisions, some provisions may limit employees ability to 
speak out about allegations of workplace harassment.140 However, several 
states have introduced and passed legislation making such agreements, 
particularly non-disclosure agreements, unenforceable if they limit an 
employee’s ability to disclose allegations of sexual harassment.141 Several 
states have adopted legislation that seeks to ban non-disclosure agreements 
as related to sexual harassment and discrimination.142 A bill was also 
introduced in Congress that would outlaw non-disclosure and non-
 
136 Marks, supra note 70, at 1437. 
137 See Elizabeth Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
229, 242 (2018). 





140 See, e.g., id. 
141 Id. 
142 Anna North, 7 Positive Changes that Have Come from the #MeToo Movement, VOX (Oct. 4, 
2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/4/20852639/me-too-movement-sexual-
harassment-law-2019 [https://perma.cc/CXV9-L5QL] (“In September 2018,	California banned the 
agreements	in cases involving sexual assault, harassment, or sex discrimination.	New York	and	New 
Jersey	enacted similar laws.”). 
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disparagement agreements in employment contracts to ensure victims of 
workplace harassment are not silenced.143 
Likewise, certain courts are beginning to recognize the admissibility of 
“me-too” evidence, which entails “other instances of discrimination or 
harassment against other employees by the alleged harasser or the same 
employer” that can be used “in an effort to show a pattern or practice of 
misconduct to prove or at least bolster discrimination or harassment 
claims.”144 Although the question of the admissibility of this kind of 
evidence arose before the #MeToo movement, and the Supreme Court 
previously ruled “that such evidence is neither per se admissible nor per se 
inadmissible,”145 in light of the movement several federal courts have 
allowed such probative evidence to support such hostile work environment 
claims.146 
Additionally, attention has been brought to the “severe and pervasive” 
standard of hostile work environment claims. Federal courts have historically 
found that certain conduct may not be grave enough to meet the standard of 
severe or pervasive, even if an employee had been subject to frequent 
inappropriate conduct.147 However, in the wake of #MeToo, many have 
criticized the stringent manner in which this element has been applied, and 
scholars have predicted that the movement may influence how judges 
approach the application of this element of such claims.148 Significantly, in 
 
143 Lauren Holter, What is the EMPOWER Act? This Workplace Harassment Bill Could Make 
NDAs a Thing of the Past, BUSTLE (July 17, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/what-is-the-empower-
act-this-workplace-harassment-bill-could-make-ndas-a-thing-of-the-past-9792924 
[https://perma.cc/G5MC-GAG2]. 
144 Justin Hanassab & Kathryn T. McGuigan, “Me-Too” Evidence in the Era of the #MeToo 
Movement, 3 BENDER’S CAL. LAB. & EMP. BULL. 71, 71, 73 (2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/-
/media/files/publication/outside-publication/article/2018/bendersca-metoo-evidence-
march2018.ashx [https://perma.cc/R2R3-PX5C]. 
145 Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 522 U.S. 379, 381 (2008). 
146 See Hanassab & McGuigan, supra note 144, at 73-74. 
147 See H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. §	204(a)(17) (2019) (explaining that “some lower court decisions 
further have interpreted the ‘severe or pervasive’ language in the Meritor decision so narrowly as to 
recognize only the most egregious conduct as unlawful, despite Congress’ intent that title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 afford a broad scope of protection from discrimination”); see also Mitchell 
v. Pope, 189 F. App’x 911, 913-14 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that instances of sexually derogatory 
remarks and offensive touching did not meet the severe or pervasive standard). 
148 See e.g., Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s Not (Legally) 
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-
employees-laws-.html [https://perma.cc/HUP6-GZPQ] (“[A] supervisor raping an employee has 
consistently been viewed as ‘severe’ enough to meet the bar .	.	.	. Other conduct, by contrast, is never 
going to meet the threshold—say, if a supervisor asks an employee out on a date once and does not 
treat her differently after she declines. In the middle, however, some judges see an area of 
uncertainty. And in such cases, courts often err on the side of dismissal.”); see also Rebecca White, 
Title VII and the #MeToo Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1, 7 (2018), 
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2159&context=fac_artchop 
 
2020] Redefining Reasonableness 1089 
2019, the BE HEARD Act was introduced before Congress and seeks to 
redefine this standard.149 
The emphasis this movement has brought to issues of harassment can aid 
in changing the way instances of workplace harassment are handled. 
However, the founder of the #MeToo movement, Tarana Burke, has 
expressed concern over the direction the movement has taken, noting that 
“[s]uddenly, a movement to centre survivors of sexual violence is being talked 
about as a vindictive plot against men.”150 Thus, the focus should be centered 
on changing the law in order to best support survivors of harassment. Social 
movements can fade from the spotlight or be misconstrued to achieve 
political aim, but the law is what will enable change to endure.151 
Based on the problematic nature in which the Faragher-Ellerth defense has 
been applied, federal courts should take an approach that emphasizes 
consideration of the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ actions and their 
employers’ response. This framework should set a standard that aims to 
eradicate the incongruous applications of both the first and second element 
of the defense. With regard to the first element, rather than accepting that 
the implementation of an anti-harassment policy is satisfactory at face value, 
the approach should encourage consideration of whether the policy the 
employer put in place to prevent harassment had the means of being effective. 
Additionally, it should encourage consideration of whether the employer’s 
efforts to correct instances of harassment were reasonable in light of the 
circumstances. This framework should prevent courts from engaging in 
burden-shifting analyses or approaches that allow courts to circumvent any 
aspect of the defense. Similarly, it should deter courts from systematically 
finding that a delay in the employee’s reporting is unreasonable as a matter 
 
[https://perma.cc/VX5T-P233] (noting that “lower courts .	.	. have freedom to determine that 
conduct that may not have been regarded as sufficiently severe or pervasive even just a few years 
ago should now be recognized as actionable”); Tippett, supra note 137, at 242 (“Judges of all stripes 
may be influenced by MeToo in ways that alter their application of the legal rules.”). 
149 The Act’s name stands for “Bringing an End to Harassment by Enhancing Accountability 
and Rejecting Discrimination in the Workplace.” Vania Leveille & Lenora M. Lapidus, The BE 
HEARD Act Will Overhaul Workplace Harassment Laws, ACLU (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/be-heard-act-will-overhaul-
workplace-harassment-laws [https://perma.cc/AM8M-VDT5]. The bill addresses the issue of an 
inexact, severe, and pervasive standard and seeks to establish a uniform standard of liability to be 
applied in cases of workplace harassment. H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. §	204(a)(11)-(19), (b)(2) (2019). 
150 Tarana Burke: MeToo Movement Not a War Against Men, BBC (Feb. 21, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-51574913/tarana-burke-metoo-movement-not-a-war-against-
men [https://perma.cc/6AJM-L4X8]; Jane Wakefield, MeToo Founder Tarana Burke: Campaign Now 
“Unrecognizable”, BBC (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-46393369 
[https://perma.cc/8TX3-BDG8]. 
151 Last year, scholar Elizabeth Tippett predicted that the #MeToo movement could influence 
court decisions, including those with respect to Faragher-Ellerth. See Tippett, supra note 137, at 243. 
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of law. As these cases typically involve fact-specific issues, courts should 
refrain from determining these issues as a matter of law. The goal of this 
approach would be to ameliorate the aforementioned issues with the Faragher-
Ellerth defense, specifically to prevent inconsistent applications of the defense 
and to encourage courts to recognize the psychological impact harassment 
may have on women. Overall, it would seek to inhibit courts from granting 
summary judgment in instances where there is merit to the plaintiff ’s claim, 
and to seek to deter future instances of workplace harassment. 
One such approach has been recognized by the Third Circuit in a case 
published in July of 2018. In Minarsky v. Susquehanna County,152 the Third 
Circuit explicitly acknowledged the impact of the #MeToo movement and 
emphasized that a standard of reasonableness should govern the application 
of the Faragher-Ellerth defense.153 The court recognized that it should not 
presume the defendant-employer followed best practices with respect to the 
first element of the defense, and the court acknowledged the impact 
harassment can have on the responses and reactions of victims.154 The court 
found that such reasonableness is best left for the jury to decide.155 As of now, 
no other jurisdiction outside of the Third Circuit has adopted this 
approach.156 The adoption of this, or a similar approach, would result in a 
more uniform application of the defense and can help lead to more justified 
outcomes for victims. 
B. The Recognition of #MeToo in the Third Circuit’s                         
Interpretation of Faragher-Ellerth 
The Third Circuit’s opinion in Minarsky v. Susquehanna County addressed 
the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense through a more appropriate lens in 
light of the #MeToo movement and increased attention to workplace 
harassment. In this case, the Third Circuit addressed head-on how the “appeal 
[came] to us in the midst of national news regarding a veritable firestorm of 
allegations of rampant sexual misconduct that has been closeted for years, not 
reported by the victims.”157 The plaintiff, Minarsky, worked as a part-time 
secretary for Yadlosky at the Susquehanna County Department of Veterans 
Affairs beginning in 2009.158 Yadlosky was her direct supervisor.159 Minarsky 
 
152 895 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2018). 
153 See infra Section III.B. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 A search on Westlaw’s public court records reveals that the only district courts that have 
applied the reasoning in Minarsky specifically are courts within the Third Circuit. 
157 Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313 n.12. 
158 Id. at 306. 
159 Id. 
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alleged that Yadlosky would try to “massage her shoulders or touch her face” 
each week and would try to kiss her each Friday before she left “pull[ing] 
[her] against him.”160 Minarsky also alleged that Yadlosky would question her 
whereabouts if she left on a lunch break and would call her at home to ask 
personal questions.161 Additionally, Yadlosky would send Minarsky sexually 
explicit messages from his work computer, to which Minarsky would never 
respond, among other inappropriate conduct.162 
Susquehanna County had an anti-harassment policy that detailed that an 
employee could report any harassment committed by a supervisor to the 
Chief County Clerk or a County Commissioner.163 Minarsky never filed a 
formal report of harassment because Minarsky witnessed the Chief County 
Clerk unsuccessfully reprimand Yadlosky for his inappropriate behavior 
towards other women on two occasions, and “there was no further action or 
follow-up, nor was any notation or report placed in Yadlosky’s personnel 
file.”164 Furthermore, Minarsky claimed that Yadlosky warned her not to trust 
the County Commissioners or Chief County Clerk and that they would 
terminate her position if she did not “look busy.”165 In 2013, after four years, 
Minarsky eventually confided in a co-worker about the harassment; the co-
worker’s supervisor, overhearing the conversation, reported the harassment 
to the Chief County Clerk.166 After an investigation, Yadlosky’s employment 
was eventually terminated.167 
Minarsky brought a hostile work environment claim against Susquehanna 
County.168 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant-
employer, holding that the county had satisfied both elements of the Fargher-
Ellerth affirmative defense.169 The district court, in accepting 
recommendations set by the magistrate judge for this case,170 found that the 
county satisfied the first element because it had an anti-harassment policy, 
had reprimanded Yadlosky on two occasions in the past, and had terminated 
 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 307. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 308. 
164 Id. at 307. 
165 Id. at 308. 
166 Id. at 308-09. 
167 Id. at 309. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a district judge may refer review of a dispositive 
motion to a magistrate judge; the district court may conduct a de novo review of the 
recommendation and accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge’s recommendation de novo. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 72(b). Here, the district court adopted the findings of the Magistrate Judge in this case. 
See Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 14-2021, 2017 WL 44759781, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 2017). 
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Yadolsky’s employment in light of Minarsky’s allegations.171 The court held 
“that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly 
any sexually harassing behavior.”172 The lower court found that the second 
element of the offense was also met, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s finding 
that Minarsky’s failure to report the harassment was not reasonable: 
“Minarsky’s alleged apprehension of the Chief Clerk and County 
Commissioners [were] unreasonable, because her mistrust of them came 
‘from the very employee Minarsky claims was harassing her,’ and was not 
sufficient to excuse her failure to report.”173 The district court also adopted 
the finding that no reasonable jury could find that Minarsky acted reasonably 
in delaying to report.174 
On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected this analysis and brought to light 
the problematic way in which the Faragher-Ellerth defense has been applied 
over the past two decades. Throughout its analysis, the Third Circuit 
emphasized that the jury was in the best position to determine the 
reasonableness of the situation, describing how “[t]he cornerstone of this 
analysis is reasonableness: the reasonableness of the employer’s preventative 
and corrective measures, and the reasonableness of the employee’s efforts (or 
lack thereof) to report misconduct and avoid further harm.”175 
With regard to the first element of the defense, the Third Circuit held 
that although the county had a policy in place, there were issues of material 
fact, and “[the court] cannot agree that the County’s responses were so 
clearly sufficient as to warrant the District Court’s conclusion as a matter 
of law.”176 The Third Circuit emphasized that the reasonableness of the 
employer’s approach was best left to the jury to decide; although Yadlosky’s 
employment was terminated, a jury could potentially find that the 
defendant-employer did not follow best practices considering that Yadlosky 
was previously reprimanded twice without further consequences.177 
With regard to the second element of the defense, the Third Circuit 
declined to hold that Minarsky was unreasonable as a matter of law, even 
though Minarsky waited four years to report the allegations of harassment.178 
The Third Circuit emphasized how the circumstances of harassment can 
cause an employee to wait to report, explaining that: 
 
171 Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 310-11. 
172 Id. at 313 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)). 
173 Id. at 311 (citing Minarsky, 2017 WL 44759781, at *6). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 312. 
177 Id. 
178 The Third Circuit explained that Minarsky’s fear of being fired, fear of Yadlosky’s hostility, 
and belief that her efforts were futile were understandable “countervailing forces” that were 
additionally exacerbated by her “pressing financial situation” at the time. Id. at 314. 
2020] Redefining Reasonableness 1093 
[W]e write to clarify that a mere failure to report one’s harassment is not per se 
unreasonable. Moreover, the passage of time is just one factor in the analysis. 
Workplace sexual harassment is highly circumstance-specific, and thus the 
reasonableness of a plaintiff ’s actions is a paradigmatic question for the jury, 
in certain cases.179 
The Court continued by explaining that: 
If a plaintiff ’s genuinely held, subjective belief of potential retaliation from 
reporting her harassment appears to be well-founded, and a jury could find that 
this belief is objectively reasonable, the trial court should not find that the 
defendant has proven the second Faragher-Ellerth element as a matter of law. 
Instead, the court should leave the issue for the jury to determine at trial.180 
The Third Circuit stressed that although federal courts have frequently 
found a plaintiff ’s hesitance or failure to report unreasonable, courts should 
consider how power dynamics between an employee and her supervisor can 
provide context to a plaintiff ’s fear of reporting; thus, courts should give 
greater credence to an employee’s rationale for delaying or avoiding 
reporting.181 The court explicitly referenced how, in many instances, a victim 
of harassment may “assert[] a plausible fear of serious adverse consequences 
had they spoken up at the time that the conduct occurred” and although the 
policy of the affirmative defense “places the onus on the harassed employee 
to report her harasser, and would fault her for not calling out this conduct so 
as to prevent it, a jury could conclude that the employee’s non-reporting was 
understandable, perhaps even reasonable.”182 
Although the Third Circuit recognized that they “are sensitive to the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis that the second Faragher-Ellerth element is tied to 
the objective of Title VII, to avoid harm, rather than provide redress,” the 
court explained that it is not correct to presume that reporting harassment 
will always end the conduct, and victims may have legitimate fear relating to 
reporting due to the circumstances.183 This approach provides legitimacy to 
women’s claims of harassment and fears that it may prevent one from 
speaking out. 
This approach’s conceptualization of reasonableness as the “cornerstone” 
of the offense, and emphasis that such fact-specific inquiries are best left to 
the jury, has redefined the application of this offense to provide an outcome 
more favorable to victims of workplace harassment. The definition of 
 
179 Id. (emphasis added). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 313 n.12. 
183 Id. at 313 n.12, 315. 
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“reasonableness” as related to the defense has seemingly been misapplied, as 
federal courts have shoehorned the facts of many cases into the corners of 
the affirmative defense, despite the existence of evidence of which a 
reasonable jury could possibly find the defendant-employer liable. Here, the 
Third Circuit explicitly recognized that the law needs to give greater 
attention to this issue, referencing the #MeToo movement: “It has come to 
light, years later, that people in positions of power and celebrity have 
exploited their authority to make unwanted sexual advances.”184 The court 
reaffirmed that the heart of the defense is reasonableness, highlighting the 
problematic and inconsistent application of the defense by federal courts and 
emphasizing how it is inappropriate for courts to hold, as a matter of law, 
that an employer’s decision to wait to report instances of harassment are 
unreasonable given the detrimental effects harassment can have on a victim. 
C. Applying an Approach Centered Around Reasonableness to                 
Supervisory Harassment Cases 
Federal courts nationwide should adopt an approach centered around 
reasonableness with respect to both prongs of the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative 
defense, like the approach articulated by the Third Circuit in Minarsky, and 
should encourage courts to refrain from deciding these issues as a matter of 
law. This will diminish the inconsistent applications of the defense and help 
recognize the justifiable reasons that women may wait to report instances of 
harassment. This will provide a greater means for deterring harassment and 
allow employees to survive summary judgment in appropriate instances.185 
1. Application to the First Element of the Affirmative Defense 
Adoption of an approach centered on reasonableness would reduce federal 
courts’ inconsistent applications of the first element of the defense. As noted, 
federal courts have taken differing approaches when applying the prevention 
 
184 Id. at 313 n.12; see also, Alejandra Arroyave Lopez, Workplace Sexual Harassment Claim 
Revived Despite Delay in Reporting Misconduct, LAPIN & LEICHTLING (July 17, 2018), 
https://www.workplacesexualharassmentlaw.com/2018/07/workplace-sexual-harassment-claim-
revived-despite-delay-reporting-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/A2F3-VK37] (“Sheri Minarsky’s 
case is an example of how the law is being shaped by so many victims coming forward in the #metoo 
Movement, allowing victims more opportunities to seek redress for inexcusable conduct.”). 
185 See e.g., Paul Mollica, Minarsky v. Susquehanna Cty., No. 17-2646 (3d Cir. July 3, 2018), 
OUTTEN & GOLDEN LLP (July 3, 2018), https://www.employmentlawblog.info/2018/07/minarsky-
v-susquehanna-cty-no-17-2646-3d-cir-july-3-2018.shtml [https://perma.cc/4KVK-Y9E5] (urging 
“[e]mployee advocates in this area .	.	. to rally behind this language, which portends a change in the 
way that harassment cases	should	be adjudicated”). 
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and correction sub-prongs of the first element.186 Applying the Third 
Circuit’s standard of reasonableness would prevent courts from finding that 
mere distribution of an anti-harassment policy is adequate to satisfy the 
prevention prong of the first element of the defense and encourage 
consideration of whether the policy itself is sufficient in preventing workplace 
harassment.187 This issue is best left for the jury to decide, rather than 
allowing the court to determine that the employer’s anti-harassment policy is 
facially valid. 
Similarly, this approach would eliminate the unsubstantiated, rebuttable 
presumptions that plaintiff-employees are forced to overcome in several 
jurisdictions.188 As noted, the Fourth Circuit has applied an approach that 
requires a plaintiff to provide evidence that her employer adopted an anti-
harassment policy in bad faith or “‘was otherwise defective or dysfunctional’” 
in order to show that the prevention prong has not been satisfied.189 If the 
aforementioned approach to reasonableness had been applied in McKinney v. 
G4S Government Solutions,190 the court would likely not have granted 
summary judgment against the plaintiff. In that case, the plaintiff ’s supervisor 
allegedly threatened employees to not utilize the policy or make complaints, 
but the court still held the defendant-employer satisfied the prevention 
prong.191 A court in this instance should question the reasonableness of the 
employers’ actions and should not find that the defendant-employer’s 
prevention methods were satisfactory as a matter of law; instead, this should 
be left for the jury to decide. 
As noted, some federal courts have seemingly circumvented applying the 
second prong of this element, the correction prong; the Eleventh Circuit and 
the district courts within its jurisdiction have done so,192 while other federal 
 
186 See supra Section II.A. Scholars have previously proposed implementing a standard such as 
the “reasonable woman” standard, considering that women respond and react differently to such 
harassment than men. See Hebert, supra note 45, at 732-42. I would argue that this approach 
propagates a gender divide, and that a standard “reasonableness” approach is more appropriate. 
187 See supra note 56 and related discussion. Though having juries resolve such claims could 
result in inconsistent outcomes, adopting an approach like the Third Circuit’s would better resolve 
the problem of inconsistent application of the defense among federal courts that leads to 
unreasonable grants of summary judgment in favor of defendant-employers. 
188 See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
the Fourth Circuit applies the presumption that distribution of a harassment policy provides a 
rebuttable presumption that the employer exercised reasonable care with respect to the first prong 
that the employee can only overcome with evidence that the policy was made in bad faith or was 
otherwise defective); see also supra note 55 and related discussion. 
189 Walton v. N.C. Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 494 F. App’x 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(citing Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
190 179 F. Supp. 3d 609, 623 (W.D. Va. 2016). 
191 Id. 
192 See supra note 64 and related discussion. 
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courts have required evidence that the employer’s correction methods “must 
[have been] calculated to prevent further harassment.”193 Here, the 
reasonableness of the employers should not be determined as a matter of law. 
In the aforementioned case of Scott v. Publix, the Southern District of Florida 
found it was not necessary to apply the correction prong because the plaintiff 
did not provide notice to her employer of the alleged harassment.194 This is 
an instance where the court should not have determined that the defendant-
employer satisfied this sub-prong; it would be best left for the jury to 
examine the defendant-employer’s reasonableness and decide whether the 
approach the employer took was sufficient, or if the employer should have 
taken more action.195 
Overall, greater consideration should be taken in determining whether 
the defendant-employer has succeeded in both preventing and correcting 
instances of harassment. Courts should recognize that determining the 
appropriate level of reasonableness should not be decided as a matter of law; 
this will aid to prevent the application of inconsistent standards courts 
currently apply to the defense. 
2. Application to the Second Element of the Affirmative Defense 
Applying this standard of reasonableness to the second element of the 
affirmative defense would also aid in resolving the inconsistent applications 
of the defense. Specifically, this would erode the circuit split related to single-
onset cases. As noted, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits provide that if an 
employee experiences a single, severe case of harassment, her claim will be 
dismissed if the defendant-employer meets only the first element of the 
affirmative defense.196 If an approach like the Third Circuit’s is applied, it 
would help to resolve this circuit split, and employees would not be at risk of 
having their claim of a severe instance of harassment fail at summary 
judgment in those jurisdictions. For example, if the reasonableness approach 
had been adopted in the aforementioned case of Indest v. Freeman Decorating, 
Inc.,197 the plaintiff would not have been barred from having her claim heard 
on the merits simply because she was the victim of one, serious incident of 
harassment. Adopting this approach would allow plaintiffs across 
 
193 Cerros v. Steel Tech., Inc., 398 F.3d 944, 953 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t 
of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)); see supra note 69 and related discussion. 
194 No. 07-60624, 2008 WL 2940672, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 28, 2008); see supra note 66 and 
related discussion. 
195 But see supra note 69 and related discussion; Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (noting that it is not necessary to consider whether the employer’s prevention and 
correction methods were successful). 
196 See supra Section II.B. 
197 164 F.3d 258, 260 (5th Cir. 1999). 
2020] Redefining Reasonableness 1097 
jurisdictions to have more consistent expectations of their claims at the 
pleadings stage, so that one plaintiff would not be more likely than another 
to win at the summary judgment stage depending on which jurisdiction the 
claim is brought in. It would also afford plaintiffs the opportunity for a more 
just outcome, rather than allowing courts to inequitably dispose of such 
claims through summary judgment. 
Further, federal courts have frequently held that an employee’s decision 
to delay reporting for a few weeks or months is unreasonable as a matter of 
law, enabling the defendant-employer to succeed at summary judgment.198 
The Supreme Court has never provided for a bright-line rule that indicates 
how long an employee is permitted to wait before reporting, resulting in 
uncertainty as to how this element should be evaluated. Courts should 
recognize that “a mere failure to report one’s harassment is not per se 
unreasonable” and that “[w]orkplace sexual harassment is highly 
circumstance-specific, and thus the reasonableness of a plaintiff ’s actions is a 
paradigmatic question for the jury” would limit the inclination of courts to 
hold that a victim of harassment was unreasonable for waiting a few months 
to report.199 In contrast with Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, in which the court held 
the plaintiff was unreasonable for waiting four months to report the incidents 
of harassment,200 Minarsky waited four years to report, and the Third Circuit 
still held that Minarsky’s reasonableness was for the jury to decide. 
This approach aptly recognizes that harassment can cause trauma, and 
that victims may feel uncomfortable expressing their concerns and 
experiences with their employers. Though in Minarsky the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that the underlying policy expressed in Faragher and Ellerth 
was “to avoid harm, rather than provide redress,” the court emphasized how 
the plaintiff ’s reasons for failing to report should not be dismissed.201 The 
emphasis on reasonableness recognizes that the judicial system should not 
fault a victim for waiting to report or discount “an employee’s subjective fears 
of confrontation” or “unpleasantness” that they may experience when coping 
with the situation.202 The Third Circuit understood the “physical and 
emotional toll” that harassment can have on a victim and did not disregard 
the implications such conduct can have on one’s psyche.203 
 
198 See supra Section II.C. 
199 Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 F.3d 303, 314 (3d Cir. 2018). 
200 931 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2019); see supra notes 83–87 and related discussion. 
201 Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 313. 
202 Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. 
Missouri Dep’t of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2005)); see supra note 117 and 
related discussion. 
203 Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 316; see supra notes 101–117 and related discussion. 
1098 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1061 
Additionally, under this approach, the factfinders can be forgiving to 
plaintiffs who may not follow their employer’s policy exactly. As noted, 
courts have held that if a plaintiff reported an allegation of harassment to 
their employer but diverged from the procedure outlined in the employer’s 
anti-harassment policy, her conduct can be held unreasonable as a matter of 
law.204 However, a plaintiff may not feel comfortable reporting an instance 
of harassment to the party designated by her employer’s anti-harassment 
policy. Thus, the court should not decide that it was unreasonable as a matter 
of law for the plaintiff to report an incident of harassment to a party other 
than the party designated in the employment policy, as this should be a 
consideration for the jury. 
Further, victims of harassment may have legitimate fears and reasons for 
delaying their decisions to report, or for failing to report entirely. As noted, in 
many instances federal courts have held that a plaintiff was unreasonable for 
failing to report even though she feared that she would be retaliated against; 
courts have required plaintiffs to provide credible evidence to substantiate 
their claims and even shifted the burden on plaintiffs to report.205 In contrast, 
an approach that emphasizes reasonableness supports giving weight to the 
fears and claims of plaintiffs. The Third Circuit’s standard, as an exemplar, 
encompasses both subjective and objective components, as the plaintiff must 
hold a subjective fear of retaliation, and the jury must find this claim to be 
objectively reasonable.206 This approach recognizes that plaintiffs’ subjective 
fears should be given weight as credible evidence. This approach would allow 
plaintiffs’ claims to survive summary judgment, rather than finding plaintiffs’ 
response to be unreasonable as a matter of law. 
Overall, application of the Third Circuit’s framework provides great 
consideration to the plaintiffs’ reasoning in deciding whether to report 
incidents of harassments. It recognizes the psychological impact harassment 
can have on victims, which federal courts tend to ignore. Other jurisdictions 
should adopt an approach that emphasizes reasonableness as it will allow 
plaintiffs to justly survive summary judgment, rather than prematurely 
dismissing their claims.207 
 
204 See supra subsection II.C.2. 
205 See supra subsection II.C.3. 
206 Minarsky, 895 F.3d at 314. In Minarsky, the court explained that if “[p]resented with these 
facts, a reasonable jury could find that Minarsky’s fears of aggravating her work environment was 
sufficiently specific, rather than simply a generalized, unsubstantiated fear.” Id. at 315. 
207 Under this approach, the case can proceed to the jury, or may be settled, which can help 
these claims have a more just result. See Marks, supra note 70, at 1452 (“The confounding challenge 
of deciding these matters on summary judgment highlights the especially appropriate role of the 
jury in deciding the impact of the Ellerth defense .	.	.	.”). 
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3. Additional Implications of Applying a Framework                        
Focused on Reasonableness 
If defendant-employers are granted summary judgment on fewer hostile 
work environment claims, this may encourage employers to strengthen and 
promote their anti-harassment policies and provide thorough anti-harassment 
training. Applying an approach like the Third Circuit’s may encourage 
employers to provide extensive corrective measures if inappropriate conduct 
is reported. These changes would promote workplace measures that deter 
harassment, creating safer workplace environments. 
Employers may fear that under this framework they would never be able to 
succeed on summary judgment, and that this approach would turn the defense 
into a form of strict liability. However, the approach would not prohibit a court 
from granting summary judgment for the defendant-employer, and the 
defendant-employer would still have the ability to raise a strong defense at the 
trial stage, if the defense does not otherwise settle the claim. 
This approach would not be inconsistent with the manner in which other 
employment discrimination claims are treated. In the context of age 
discrimination claims, the Supreme Court has previously held that when a 
plaintiff brings forth credible evidence to establish his or her claim, liability 
should not be decided as a matter of law. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products, the Supreme Court held that in an instance where a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case of discrimination in an age discrimination claim 
under the Age Discrimination of Employment Act and produces evidence for 
the jury to reject the defendants’ nondiscriminatory explanations, the case 
should not be decided as a matter of law, and should go to the jury.208 In 
concurrence, Justice Ginsburg noted that “the ultimate question of liability 
ordinarily should not be taken from the jury once the plaintiff has introduced 
the two categories of evidence” relevant to the claim.209 Thus, it would not be 
incongruous if the jury frequently considered the application of the Faragher-
Ellerth defense in the context of hostile work environment cases. 
It could be argued that promoting sending such cases to the jury will result 
in inconsistent outcomes, often unfavorable for plaintiffs. A study conducted 
in 2003 that analyzed every wrongful discharge and employment 
discrimination case reported in California in 1998 and 1999 found that there 
were “low success rates of women and minorities in employment 
discrimination cases,” which may be explained by judicial bias.210 However, it 
 
208 530 U.S. 133, 149-52 (2000). 
209 Id. at 155 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
210 David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment 
Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 560 (2003). 
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is possible that in the current era juries are more understanding towards 
women’s hostile work environment claims. Further, the law in itself should 
not unjustly bar plaintiffs’ ability to succeed on these claims. 
In this era of #MeToo, the benefits of adopting an approach that centers 
around reasonableness outweighs the potential negatives. Adopting an 
approach like the Third Circuit’s can be the change the law needs to provide 
justified support for victims of workplace harassment. 
 CONCLUSION 
Overall, federal courts’ interpretations and applications of the Faragher-
Ellerth defense to cases of workplace harassment committed by an employee’s 
supervisor have been inconsistent across jurisdictions and have created 
unnecessary impediments to plaintiffs’ claims. Though the Supreme Court 
in deciding Faragher and Ellerth sought to encourage women to report their 
harassment and deter harm, the application of the affirmative defense has 
been construed to frequently impede plaintiffs’ claims. Both elements of the 
defense have been applied in inconsistent manners that do not achieve the 
Supreme Court’s goals of deterring harm. Rather, the defense has been 
applied in a way that seems to justify defendant-employers providing limited 
measures to prevent harassment, while also failing to acknowledge that a 
plaintiff-employee may have legitimate reasons for failing to report instances 
of harassment to their employer. 
Applying a framework that centers on reasonableness, like the Third 
Circuit’s framework outlined in Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, would 
resolve many of these issues. If other federal circuit courts adopted this 
standard of reasonableness, it would reduce the inconsistent application of 
both elements of the defense and would provide greater recognition to the 
legitimacy of plaintiffs’ reasons for failing to report harassment. Adopting 
this approach would aim to deter harm as the Supreme Court intended. 
In the future, it would be beneficial for the Supreme Court to reevaluate 
the viability of the Faragher-Ellerth defense to align with the traditional 
policy goals of vicarious liability. Though the Court in Faragher and Ellerth 
declined to apply vicarious liability to the affirmative defense, treating 
claims of hostile work environment in the same manner in which intentional 
torts are treated may further the policy of deterring harm, something to be 
explored in a future work. 
